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1. Introduction 
During the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the subsequent recession, 
Central Banks and governments responded by injecting additional liquidity into 
the system and pursuing expansionary fiscal policies, respectively. With the world 
economy in (the process of returning to) normality, fiscal positions are also being 
tightened up. Nevertheless, the significant deterioration of public finances post 
20071 has put on alert Credit Rating Agencies (hereafter CRAs). For instance, 
Moody’s Investor Services, a major credit rating agency, has downgraded over the 
2008-2013 period the debt rating of a number of peripheral European countries, 
namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (hereafter the GIIPS) and Cyprus 
by 63 notches in total.2 Similar decisions have been implemented by the other two 
main CRAs, namely Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) and Fitch Ratings, respectively.3 
Sovereign credit ratings provide a measure of the probability that a country will 
default on its debt obligations. In that sense, they set the tone for borrowing costs 
in international markets both for a sovereign state and the financial institutions 
operating in that sovereign state (for recent evidence, see Drago and Gallo, 2017). 
This is vital for stimulating investments and supporting economic growth. 
Reputational concerns do discipline the decisions made by CRAs (see e.g. Bar-
Isaac and Shapiro, 2013 and Mariano, 2012). However, the value of reputation 
depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the business cycle. Using a 
theoretical model of credit ratings with endogenous reputation, Bar-Isaac and 
Shapiro (2013) relate credit ratings decisions to the economic cycle. They find that 
CRAs are more likely to issue less accurate ratings when fee-income is high, the 
economy is booming and securities’ default probabilities are low. Indeed, during 
booms, hiring skilled analysts becomes more expensive for CRAs. At the same 
                                                          
1 For instance, the International Monetary Fund estimates that gross debt in thirty-nine advanced 
economies deteriorated from 71.2% of GDP in 2007 to 107.5% in 2016 whereas gross debt in the 
Euro area deteriorated from 64.9% of GDP in 2007 to 91.7% of GDP in 2016. Data available from: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weoselagr.aspx.  
2 In particular, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus have been downgraded by 14, 10, 
6, 10, 9 and 14 notches, respectively by Moody’s. 
3 The three main CRAs have a total EU market share of 92.85% (see 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/20161662_cra_market_share_calculati
on.pdf).  
3 
 
time, CRAs can potentially charge higher fees and since bond issues are less likely 
to default, monitoring a CRA activity becomes less effective.  
Although the recent empirical literature has discussed a number of quantitative 
and qualitative factors affecting the decisions of CRAs, an increasingly large 
number of decisions appear to remain unexplained. For instance, some of the 
downgrades of peripheral European debt which took place in 2010 and beyond 
have been contested by the downgraded peripheral countries and by prominent 
European policymakers. Speaking to the European parliament in May 2010, Jose 
Manuel Barroso, then the European Union Commission President, criticised the 
three main CRAs noting that “deficiencies in their working methods has led to 
ratings being too cyclical, too reliant on the general market mood rather than on 
fundamentals-regardless of whether market mood is too optimistic or too 
pessimistic” (Barroso, 2010).  
In a letter published in March 2011 by The Economist, David Beers, Standard & 
Poor’s (at that time) Global head of sovereign ratings, defended the record of the 
CRAs. He noted that credit ratings “provide a robust ranking of the risk of 
sovereign default” and “are independent opinions of creditworthiness based on 
fundamental analysis and therefore should be expected to change as credit risk 
evolves over the cycle”. Gärtner and Griesbach (2012) argued that "sovereign 
ratings, their meaning and their underlying procedures are rather opaque”. They 
also went on to argue that “the set of relevant fundamental variables is an open 
one, and the interpretation of ever evolving political institutions and processes in 
unprecedented environments are a dime a dozen”. Moritz Kraemer, Global Chief 
Rating Officer of Standard & Poor’s, dismissed the arguments of Gärtner and 
Griesbach (2012) as “simply wrong” and went on to note that S&P’s sovereign 
rating decisions are accompanied by comprehensive published rationales and, 
often, press releases that explain their reasoning and approach. Kraemer (2012) 
also pointed out that S&P’s explain on their website how they arrive at their 
ratings and how their ratings perform over time (see 
www.understandingratings.com) which makes their publications as transparent 
and complete as possible.  
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The growing dissatisfaction across Europe about some of the recent credit rating 
decisions, has given rise to talks amongst Eurozone member states about setting 
up a European credit rating agency which will increase competition in the rating 
business. Nevertheless, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been very cautious 
about how quickly such a project could be deployed. In February 2011, the ECB 
pointed out that a new credit rating agency will have to rely on extensive data, a 
number of models, experienced staff and go through building a sound track record 
for several years before it establishes itself as a credible agency in the rating 
business (Tait, 2011). In 2016, European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), which is the authority competent for the supervision of CRAs, published 
a report on sovereign ratings processes which noted that because of a “switch to 
a regulated industry with focus on integrity of process…ESMA has driven 
significant changes in the credit rating process and the methodology…thereby 
strengthening their integrity, independence, quality and transparency (ESMA 
2016 Report, page 16). 
This paper attempts a comprehensive assessment of credit rating decisions made 
by the three main CRAs for the Eurozone economies in light of the ongoing 
criticism discussed above. The existing literature on the determinants of sovereign 
credit ratings has focussed on several macroeconomic, qualitative and risk factors. 
Recent studies focus on time-varying models of credit ratings (Reusens and Croux, 
2017) and models with debt levels conditional on debt being above or below 
endogenously determined debt threshold levels (Hmiden et al., 2016). Prior to 
this, Afonso et al. (2011) examine differentiations across rating levels by splitting 
their dataset into two groups according to the ratings level, namely high-rated 
countries with credit grades BBB+ and above and low rated countries with credit 
grades BBB and below. 
Arguably, however, the actual degree of importance of the different explanatory 
variables across the conditional distribution of sovereign credit rating has not 
been explored in detail as most of the studies focus on the average responses.  
We fill the gap in the literature by implementing panel quantile estimation with 
nonadditive fixed effects as proposed by Powell (2016). Our contribution to the 
existing literature is summarised as follows: First, we employ a panel quantile 
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framework that allows us to observe the relative importance of quantitative and 
qualitative factors across the conditional distribution of sovereign credit ratings. 
Second, we augment the information set considered in previous studies by 
examining and identifying the significant impact of competitiveness and the 
European economic policy uncertainty index on the Eurozone sovereign credit 
ratings.  
Among our findings, the unemployment rate, regulatory quality and 
competitiveness have a stronger impact for low rated countries whereas GDP per 
capita is a major driver of high rated countries. A reduction in the current account 
deficit or an increase in the current account surplus leads to a rating or outlook 
upgrade for low rated countries. Economic policy uncertainty impacts negatively 
on credit ratings across the conditional distribution; however, the impact is 
stronger on the lower rated countries. We quantify the effects of uncertainty on 
credit ratings by using estimates of our model under uncertainty to infer what 
credit ratings would have been had uncertainty remained at its 2002-2007 pre-
financial and pre-European debt crisis average value. We find that economic policy 
uncertainty in the Euro area has reduced Greece’s credit rating by some 3 notches 
at the height of the Eurozone crisis in 2011 and in 2012; the impact of uncertainty 
has been substantial but somewhat less severe for the remaining GIIPS and 
Cyprus. In other words, our empirical analysis suggests a pivotal role that 
economic policy uncertainty in the Euro area has played in downgrading the credit 
profile of Eurozone’s periphery. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 
introduces the model and Section 4 presents the empirical estimates. Section 5 
provides a discussion of our findings and offers some policy implications. Finally, 
Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
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2. Data 
We use annual data from 2002 to 2015 for nineteen Eurozone countries (266 
observations in total). Our dependent variable is the sovereign credit rating 
published by the three main international rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P’s) and Fitch Ratings (attributed at the end of each calendar year). A 
linear transformation of credit ratings to numerical scale is implemented starting 
from 21 for the highest quality with a stable outlook (AAA for Fitch and S&P’s and 
Aaa for Moody’s) and ending to 1 for Default (D for Fitch and S&P’s and C for 
Moody’s). The difference between two continuous ratings with the same outlook 
is always equal to 1. Not only we account for changes in credit ratings, but we also 
consider changes in credit outlooks.4 The difference between two continuous 
outlooks is always equal to 1/3, so the difference between two continuous ratings 
with the same outlook is always equal to one. Table 1 reports the linear 
transformation of credit ratings. 
We adopt a set of explanatory variables previously used in the literature (see e.g. 
Reusens and Croux, 2017; Dimitrakopoulos and Kolossiatis, 2016, Aizenman et al., 
2013 and Afonso et al., 2011), namely GDP per capita, Government Debt, Current 
Account Balance, Inflation Rate, Unemployment Rate and Regulatory Quality 
Index. Further, we consider two new explanatory variables. The first one is the 
Competitiveness Indicator; an increase in the index implies lower competitiveness 
which impacts negatively on credit rating decisions.5 Weak competiveness is often 
highlighted by government authorities and international organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) as one of the main drawbacks of Eurozone’s 
periphery relative to Eurozone’s core. The second explanatory variable is the 
                                                          
4 We do not account for watch positive and watch negative outlooks for two reasons. First, we 
assume that the positive (negative) outlook is conceptually very close to watch positive (watch 
negative) outlook and, second, the number of watch positive and watch negative observations in 
our dataset is very small. 
5 This is the harmonised competitiveness indicator based on unit labour costs indices for the total 
economy; available from: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_statistics/escb/html/table.en.html?id=JDF_EXR_HCI_ULC
T&period=index. 
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European Policy Uncertainty Index. This captures the impact of uncertainty, 
generally on the behaviour of rating agencies over time and more specifically on 
the cumulative downgrades of periphery’s bonds during the recent Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis. The index is constructed based on newspaper articles 
regarding policy uncertainty from 10 leading European newspapers. It counts the 
number of newspaper articles containing the terms uncertain or uncertainty, 
economic or economy, and one or more policy-relevant terms; for more 
information see Baker et al. (2015) and 
http://www.policyuncertainty.com/index.html. Appendix Table A.1 provides 
details on our data definitions and sources. 
Next, we discuss the expected impact of each explanatory variable on credit 
ratings: 
1. GDP per capita – positive response: Higher GDP per capita coincides with a 
larger tax base and, therefore, an increased ability of the government to 
repay its obligations. This variable can also reflect economic development. 
2. Government debt – negative response: A high stock of government debt 
implies higher interest rates to accommodate it. Therefore, additional 
financial resources are needed to repay debt obligations. A higher 
government debt can increase the risk of default. 
3. Current account balance – uncertain response: On the one hand, a higher 
current account deficit can signal overconsumption, undermining 
prosperity in the long run. On the other hand, it might have a positive effect, 
taking into account the productivity of the additional investments and their 
potentially positive economic impact in the short run. 
4. Inflation rate – uncertain response: Higher inflation rates are a sign of 
structural and macroeconomic imbalances in the government’s finances. 
On the other hand, very low inflation might lead to a deflationary spiral 
(Reusens and Croux, 2017). If we were dealing with debt in domestic 
currency, high inflation reduces the real stock of government debt in 
domestic currency and partially offsets the negative impact of high 
inflation.  
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5. Unemployment rate – negative response: A country with lower 
unemployment has an efficient labour market. The lower is the 
unemployment, the greater is overall taxable income and the lower the 
fiscal burden for unemployment subsidies. 
6. Regulatory quality6 – positive response: A high value of regulatory quality 
index reflects the ability of the government to implement necessary 
regulations that can boost private sector development and increase 
investment and GDP. Moreover it can be a qualitative quantification of the 
government’s willingness to repay its obligations. 
7. Competitiveness indicator – negative response: Competitiveness reflects a 
country’s ability to attract private investments in an international 
environment. 
8. European policy uncertainty – negative response: Higher uncertainty 
worsens the economic environment, makes consumers and investors more 
cautious and reduces future consumption and investment. 
 
3. Methodology 
Quantile regression is appropriate when the variables of interest potentially have 
varying effects at different points of the conditional distribution of the outcome 
variable. In recent years, there has been a growing literature that combines 
quantile estimation with panel data. In mean regression, panel data allow for the 
inclusion of fixed effects to capture within group variation. Many quantile panel 
data estimators use an analogous method and include additive fixed effects. 
However, the additive fixed effects change the underlying model. We implement 
the quantile regression estimator for panel data (QRPD) with nonadditive fixed 
effects introduced by Powell (2016).  
                                                          
6 Regulatory quality index is a combination of several individual variables such as investment and 
financial freedom, business regulatory environment, competition policy, tax inconsistency, 
financial institution's transparency, public sector openness to foreign bidders and easiness to start 
new business. See:  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf.  
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The main advantage of this method relative to the existing quantile estimators 
with additive fixed effects (αi) is that it provides estimates of the distribution of Yit  
given Dit instead of Yit – αi  given Dit.7  
Powell (2016) notes that in many empirical applications the latter is undesirable. 
This is because observations at the top of the (Yit − αi) distribution may be at the 
bottom of the Yit distribution and therefore additive ﬁxed eﬀect models cannot 
provide information about the eﬀects of the policy variables on the outcome 
distribution. Thus, Powell’s (2016) method provides point estimates which can be 
interpreted in the same way as the ones coming from cross-sectional regression. 
It is also consistent for small T.  The underlying model is: 
     
8
' *
1
( )it it j it
j
Y D U

 ,     (1) 
where Yit  is the sovereign credit rating for each CRA,  βj is the parameter of  
interest, Dit  is the set of explanatory variables and *itU  is the error term that may 
be a function of several disturbance terms, some fixed and some time-varying.  The 
model is linear in parameters and 
' ( )itD    is strictly increasing in  . In general, 
for the th  quantile of 
itY , quantile regression relies on the conditional restriction:   
     '( ( ) )it it itP Y D D        (2) 
Equation (2) states that the probability the outcome variable is smaller than the 
quantile function is the same for all Dit and equal to  . Powell’s (2016) QRPD 
estimator allows this probability to vary by individual and even within-individual 
as long as such variation is orthogonal to the instruments. Thus, QRPD relies on a 
conditional restriction and an unconditional restriction, letting 1( ,..., )i i iTD D D : 
                                                          
7 That is due to the different structural quantile functions (SQF). The SQF of QRPD is 
' ( )d   . In 
contrast, the SQF of models using additive fixed effects is 
_ _
' ( )i d    where d denotes potential 
values of Dit and τ is the relevant quantile of Yit.  The notation 
_ _
( )    for the additive fixed effect 
model is used to highlight that these parameters are different than those used in the nonadditive 
fixed effects model. 
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Powell (2016) develops the estimator in an instrumental variables context given 
instruments   1,...,i i iTZ Z Z  but notes that if the explanatory variables are 
exogenous (in which case i iD Z ) many of the identiﬁcation conditions are met 
trivially. Estimation uses Generalized Method of Moments. Sample moments are 
defined as: 
1
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_
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Using (3), the parameter set is defined as: 
  
'
1
1 1
{ 1( ) }
N
it itb Y D b
N N 
 

       for all t. (5) 
Then, the parameter of interest is estimated as 
  'ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) arg min ( ) ( )
b
g b g b

 

   (6) 
for some weighting matrix ˆ . The model is estimated using the Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) optimization method.8  
  
                                                          
8 All estimations are done in STATA using David Powell’s quantile estimator with nonadditive fixed 
effects  available at: 
https://sites.google.com/site/davidmatthewpowell/quantile-regression-with-nonadditive-fixed-
effects.  
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Main estimates 
We capture the varying effects on credit ratings by estimating the model for the 
0.05, 0.10, 0.15,…, 0.75 quantiles for each of the three CRAs (the model also 
estimates time fixed effects).9 In order to control for potential endogeneity, we re-
run the same model treating all explanatory variables as endogenous and using 
first-order lags as instruments. Estimated results (reported in Appendix Tables 
A.2-A.4) are very similar to those reported below.  
Tables 2-4 report estimated coefficients, associated p-values, the pseudo-R2 and 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for each quantile and each CRA. All 
explanatory variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant at 
almost all quantiles. The impact of the unemployment rate, regulatory quality and 
competitiveness is stronger at low ratings. For instance, the coefficient of 
unemployment rate reduces from -0.4446 at the 0.05 quantile to -0.2201 at the 
0.35 quantile and then to -0.0069 at the 0.75 quantile for Fitch. The estimates for 
Moody’s and S&P’s follow a similar pattern. Based on the quantile distribution, the 
impact of an improvement in regulatory quality on credit ratings is almost two 
times higher for counties rated at A1 and below for Moody’s than those rated at 
Aa3 and almost 8 times higher than those rated at Aa1 or Aaa (Appendix Figures 
A.1-A.3 map the sovereign credit ratings to the quantile distribution for the three 
CRAs; these should be read together with Table 1). Additionally, ceteris paribus, 
an annual decrease in the cost competiveness index by seven points of the index 
(such a move is not unusual in our dataset) brings about one half (≈7∗0.0687) of 
a notch upgrade at the 0.05 quantile for S&P’s, one quarter (≈7∗0.0324) of a notch 
upgrade at the 0.35 and only 0.05 (≈7∗0.0061) of a notch upgrade at the 0.75 
quantile. The impact of government debt on credit ratings is almost equally 
important for countries rated at adequate payment capacity and below and for 
those rated at high and highest quality, but impressively enough, is less strong for 
countries rated at strong payment capacity (that is, A1, A2, and A3 ratings for 
Moody’s, and A+, A, and A- ratings for S&P’s and Fitch) for all three CRAs. For 
                                                          
9 Almost 25% of the observations are in the highest quality AAA. That is the reason why 0.75 is the 
highest quantile we employ in this paper. 
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example, the coefficient of Government Debt for S&P’s is -0.0398 at the 0.15 
quantile, -0.0370 at the 0.70 quantile but only -0.0209 and -0.0069 at the 0.45 and 
0.50 quantiles, respectively.  
CRAs attribute a higher weight on GDP per capita10 for high rated countries; the 
impact of GDP per capita on sovereign credit rating is almost five times higher for 
the 0.65 quantile relative to the 0.15 one and almost two times higher relative to 
the 0.30 and 0.35 quantiles for Fitch. Therefore, the high level of GDP per capita 
provides a ‘safety net’ safeguarding (to some extent) against downgrades in the 
case of high rated countries. 
The significance of inflation rate varies across the rating distribution but without 
any specific trend pattern. Economic policy uncertainty impacts negatively on 
credit ratings across the quantile distribution and the impact is stronger on the 
lower rated countries; in other words, when European uncertainty kicks in, low 
rated countries take a much bigger ‘hit’ than high rated countries. Further, the 
uncertainty effect is stronger for Moody’s and weaker for Fitch at all quantiles. 
The impact of the current account balance is positive at the 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 
quantiles for all agencies and remains positive at the 0.20, 0.25, and 0.30 quantiles 
for S&P’s and at the 0.20 and 0.30 quantiles for Fitch. The impact of the current 
account turns negative at all other quantiles for all CRAs. Hence, we find an 
asymmetric impact of the current account over the quantile distribution of 
sovereign ratings. Noting that the impact of current account balance on sovereign 
credit ratings is theoretically uncertain, our analysis shows that a reduction in the 
current account deficit or an increase in the current account surplus leads to a 
rating or outlook upgrade for low rated countries which have historically recorded 
high current account deficits.11 The effect is entirely different for countries with 
                                                          
10 Moody’s GDP per capita coefficients at the 0.05 and 0.10 part of the distribution are counter-
intuitive as is the S&P's GDP per capita coefficient at the 0.05 one. This, however, does not apply to 
Fitch. One possibility for this result is that countries at this very low part of the distribution, mainly 
Greece after 2010 and Cyprus after 2012, have witnessed persistent recession in the second half 
of the sample. 
11 Over 2002-2015, Greece recorded an average current account deficit of 7.61% as a share of its 
GDP. The corresponding deficit figures for Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus were 0.85%, 
0.87%, 6.63%, 4.02% and 6.45%. By contrast, the Euro area recorded an average current account 
surplus of 0.71% as a share of its GDP. 
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strong payment capacity, high and highest quality. In this case, a higher current 
account deficit or a lower current account surplus is associated with either higher 
creditworthiness or positive economic prospects of the economy and 
consequently a higher sovereign rating (Afonso et al., 2011). But why low rated 
countries (namely the GIIPS and Cyprus) are downgraded when they record 
higher current account deficits? Recalling that current account deficits reflect net 
borrowing from abroad, one might argue that there is nothing intrinsically wrong 
with current account imbalances if countries borrow from abroad to invest in 
capacity which consequently allows them to satisfy their debt obligations. Rather 
than doing this, Eurozone’s periphery funds from abroad largely ended up in non-
traded sectors (like government consumption and housing); see, for instance, the 
discussion in Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015).  
 
4.2. Robustness checks 
As alternatives to the European policy uncertainty index, we use (a) the US policy 
uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2015) and (b) the Euro area uncertainty proxy 
of Girardi and Reuter (2017). Like the European policy uncertainty index, the US 
one captures the policy related economic uncertainty by counting the number of 
newspaper articles containing the terms uncertain or uncertainty, economic or 
economy, and one or more policy-relevant terms of ten leading newspapers 
(including The Washington Post, The New York Times and The Wall Street 
Journal) and can be thought of as capturing spillover US economic policy effects to 
the Eurozone area. On the other hand, the Girardi and Reuter (2017) uncertainty 
measure pools information from 22 forward-looking business and consumer 
survey questions contained in the EU Business and Consumer Surveys programme 
(see Girardi and Reuter, 2017).  
The correlation between the European and US policy indices is equal to 0.80 
whereas the correlation between the European policy index and the survey-based 
uncertainty measure of Girardi and Reuter (2017) is much weaker and equal to 
0.20. Figure 1 plots together the three uncertainty measures. Notice that European 
policy uncertainty is much more volatile than the remaining uncertainty 
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measures; it also shows a marked increase following from the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis and the most recent Eurozone debt crisis in 2011-2012. It drops after ECB 
President Mario Draghi pledged in 2012 that the ECB was ‘ready to do whatever it 
takes’ to protect the Eurozone from collapse.12 
Appendix Tables A.5-A.7 report the empirical estimates using the US economic 
policy uncertainty index. As can be seen from Tables A.5-A.7, there is a spillover 
negative impact of US uncertainty on Eurozone’s credit ratings but the impact is 
smaller compared to the European uncertainty impact reported in Tables 2-4. 
There is mixed evidence in terms of whether the model using the European policy 
uncertainty index dominates the model using the US one. In the case of Moody’s, 
the model using the European uncertainty index delivers a lower Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) than the model using the US index in 7 out of the 15 
quantiles of the rating distribution. In the case of S&P’s, the model using the 
European uncertainty index delivers a lower AIC than the model using the US 
index in 6 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution. In the case of Fitch, 
however, the dominance of the European index is much stronger; indeed, the 
model using the European uncertainty index delivers a lower AIC than the model 
using the US index in 11 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution. To save 
space, we do not report our estimates using the uncertainty survey-based 
measure of Girardi and Reuter (2017); these estimates are available on request. 
We note, however, that the statistical evidence in favour of a negative impact of 
the uncertainty survey-based measure is much weaker (for Moody’s, this happens 
in 6 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution; the corresponding figures 
for S&P’s and Fitch are 7 and 8, respectively). 
Compared to the alternative uncertainty measures, the stronger impact of the 
European policy uncertainty index should not necessarily come as a surprise. 
Policymakers have arguably been rather slow in putting together a workable plan 
dealing with the Eurozone crisis as planning requires in general parliamentary 
approval from all member states. In addition, the major institutions (nick-named 
as the ‘Troika’ of the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and 
                                                          
12 See e.g. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9428894/Debt-crisis-Mario-
Draghi-pledges-to-do-whatever-it-takes-to-save-euro.html. 
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the European Central Bank) have not always agreed on how to deal with issues of 
the crisis therefore fuelling policy uncertainty in the Euro area.13 Indeed, 
Eurozone’s institutional infrastructure was not prepared to deal with the crisis. 
Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015, page 21) noted in a critical manner that “judging 
from market reactions, each policy intervention made things worse” and that it 
was only in the summer of 2012 with the ‘whatever it takes’ assertion by ECB 
President Mario Draghi that the corner was turned. 
In preliminary analysis we added the growth rate of GDP as an extra explanatory 
variable but found very weak evidence of a positive and statistically significant 
impact on credit ratings; this might have to do with the persistently weak GDP 
growth rates observed in the Euro area over the recent years. Arguably, however, 
the impact of GDP growth on credit ratings is indirectly captured by the impact of 
the unemployment rate through an Okun’s-law type of approximation (in which 
case there is an inverse relationship between unemployment and GDP growth). 
Fiscal discipline has been on the agenda of policymakers in the Euro area after 
2009. Fiscal balance to-GDP-ratio was not a major concern for CRAs in making 
credit rating decisions for developed countries until the recent Eurozone debt 
crisis; Reusens and Croux (2017) identify a significant positive effect from the 
fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio on credit ratings only after 2009. In our case, we could 
only find some statistical evidence using the lagged fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio as 
an explanatory variable. Arguably, such a finding has to do with continuous 
revisions in the fiscal balance variable as well as the disagreement between 
authorities not only on the predicted fiscal balance but also on the actual 
outcome14 15; to this end, we mention the study of De Castro et al. (2013) who find 
that most preliminary European Union government balance data releases “are 
biased and non efﬁcient predictors of subsequent releases, with later vintages of 
data tending to show lower budget balances than indicated by earlier data 
releases on average” (De Castro et al., 2013, page 1207). In light of this, CRAs might 
have been reluctant to monitor current fiscal balance for credit rating decisions 
                                                          
13 See e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-33531845.  
14 See, for instance: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-deficits-idUSTRE63L1G420100422. 
15 See: http://ec.europa.eu/info/files/winter-2017-economic-forecast-greece_en.  
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which, in turn, might explain why lagged fiscal balance might play more of a role. 
Our results (available on request) suggest that there is a positive effect of the 
lagged fiscal balance throughout the distribution for Moody's, whereas, for S&P’s 
and Fitch, we find a negative effect at the 0.10 and 0.15 quantiles of distribution 
(estimates on the remaining variables are qualitatively similar to what we report 
in Tables 2-4).  
Our quantile panel model offers valuable and additional information compared to 
a standard panel model with fixed individual and time effects; detailed estimates 
of the latter model for all three CRAs are available on request. We illustrate some 
differences between the two models by focusing on the impact of regulatory 
quality in Figure 2 and on the impact of competitiveness in Figure 3. Figure 2 plots 
the estimated impact of regulatory quality for Moody’s across the conditional 
distribution of credit ratings (based on the quantile panel model reported in Table 
2) together with the estimated impact of regulatory quality for a standard panel 
model with fixed individual and time effects (which is equal to 2.912); the latter 
focuses on the conditional mean response of credit ratings. Figure 3 plots the 
estimated impact of competitiveness for Fitch across the conditional distribution 
of credit ratings (based on the quantile panel model reported in Table 4) together 
with the estimated impact of competitiveness for the standard panel model with 
fixed individual and time effects (which is equal to -0.0286). As can be seen from 
Figures 2 and 3, relying on the impact of the model with fixed effects misses 
valuable information across the quantile distribution that can only be captured by 
the quantile panel model discussed throughout this paper. 
 
5. Discussion of results and policy implications 
From a policy point of view, and noting the higher relative importance of the 
competitiveness and regulatory quality indices for Eurozone countries with low 
credit ratings, our results suggest that structural reforms and improvements in 
the competitiveness profile of these very countries will improve significantly their 
low rating profile and therefore reduce their borrowing costs in financial markets. 
This is in line with policy recommendations recently put forward by the European 
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Commission.16 In addition, a decrease in policy uncertainty in the Eurozone area 
could definitely favour all countries, but low rated would gain more in terms of 
their credit rating score. We also note the potential of indirect spillover effects 
from sovereign credit rating decisions on low rated countries to Eurozone’s 
sovereign bond yields; for instance, De Santis (2014) identifies spillover effects in 
terms of the direct impact of a Greek credit rating downgrade on other Eurozone 
sovereign yields. 
We can illustrate the effects of European uncertainty on credit ratings by using 
estimates of our credit rating model under uncertainty to infer what credit ratings 
would have been had uncertainty remained at its 2002-2007 average value. To do 
this, we construct the difference between the fitted values of the estimates of 
credit rating model (1) for each CRA (as reported in Tables 2-4) and the fitted 
values of the counterfactual model (1) which sets the post 2007 values of the 
uncertainty variable equal to its 2002-2007 average.  
Tables 5-7 report the difference between the fitted and the counterfactual values 
for Eurozone’s periphery, namely all GIIPS (that is, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) and Cyprus where a negative value of this difference indicates that 
credit ratings are lower because of the increased uncertainty.   
Our estimates suggest that economic policy uncertainty has impacted negatively 
on the credit ratings of all GIIPS and Cyprus during the 2008-2015 period. The 
impact has been more prolonged for Greece. Notice that uncertainty has reduced 
Greece’s credit rating by some 3 notches at the height of the Eurozone crisis in 
2011 and 2012 (the impact is higher in the case of Moody’s and Fitch and slightly 
lower in the case of S&P’s). This is not surprising. Greece has witnessed successive 
bail-outs and still remains (at the time of writing this paper) on bail-out support.17  
                                                          
16 See: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/cr2016_comm_en.pdf. 
17 Greece, which was bailed-out twice (for €110bn in 2010 and then again for €109bn in 2011), 
negotiated, in February 2012, a new €130bn rescue package involving a voluntary haircut of some 
53.5% on the face value of its bonds held by the private sector. Eurozone ministers agreed (in 
November 2012) to cut Greece’s debt by a further €40bn. In July 2015, Greece was bailed-out for 
a third time for €86bn. 
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From Tables 5-7, the impact of uncertainty on the remaining GIIPS and Cyprus is 
still substantial but, in general, less severe than what Greece witnessed (Portugal 
suffered, due to uncertainty, the same rating downgrades as Greece in 2011-2014; 
Cyprus suffered, due to uncertainty, the same rating downgrades as Greece in 
2012-2015).18 Again, this should not come as a surprise as the remaining GIIPS 
and Cyprus witnessed less ‘expensive’ and ‘smoother’ bail-outs; in fact, all these 
countries are now off bail-out support.19 
Earlier work by Livingston et al. (2010) suggests that Moody’s is more 
conservative (in the sense that it gives more inferior ratings) than S&P’s using 
data on US corporate bond rating decisions. From Tables 5-7, the impact of 
uncertainty on the GIIPS and Cyprus is in general more severe for Moody’s than 
for S&P’s and for Fitch. Hence, our findings support the work of Livingston et al. 
(2010) in the sense that, since the recent financial and Eurozone crises, Moody’s 
have remained more conservative than the other CRAs because of European policy 
uncertainty concerns. 
Returning to Greece, we note that the Boards of Directors of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 20 adopted, in 
January 2017, a set of short-term debt relief measures for Greece aiming at a 
                                                          
18 Notice, in Tables 5-7, some overlapping for a number of countries in a number of years. This 
should not come as a surprise. For a given quantile, the difference between the fitted values of the 
estimates of our credit rating model and the fitted values of the counterfactual model is equal to 
the estimated coefficient on uncertainty (for the quantile in question) times the difference between 
uncertainty in time period t and mean uncertainty (over 2002-2007). Recall that European 
uncertainty does not vary at the cross-sectional dimension. When two (or more countries) are 
placed in the same quantile of the rating distribution for a given time period t, the difference 
between the fitted values of the estimates of our credit rating model and the fitted values of the 
counterfactual model is the same. 
19 Ireland was bailed-out for €85bn in November 2010. Portugal was bailed-out for €78bn in May 
2011. Spain was granted, in July 2012, financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) for up to €100bn. Cyprus was bailed-out for €10bn in March 2013. See, for instance, the 
discussion in Dergiades et al., 2015 and The Financial Times ‘dedicated’ website (at 
https://www.ft.com/topics/themes/Greece_Debt_Crisis). 
20 ESM is a European Union permanent agency that provides financial assistance, in the form of 
loans, to Eurozone countries or as new capital to banks in difficulty. It has replaced the temporary 
EFSF. 
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cumulative reduction of Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio of around 20 percentage 
points until 2060.21 
Policymakers from the so-called ‘Troika’ have repeatedly pointed out that Greece 
needs to proceed with structural reforms and improve its competitiveness as 
prerequisites for getting substantial ‘medium term relief’. At the time of writing, 
Greece stood at the 0.05 quantile of the rating distribution of S&P’s (and the 
remaining CRAs), some 5 notches deep into ‘junk status territory’ 22 faced with a 
7% servicing cost for its 10-year debt; this was some 3 percentage points higher 
than the 10-year Portuguese yield and 5 percentage points higher than the 10-
year Spanish yield. Future rating upgrades of Greece (triggered, for instance, by 
accelerating structure reforms) will definitely push down Greek borrowing 
costs.23  
Although a deep front ‘voluntary’ haircut on Greek debt is not on the ‘negotiating 
table’, our estimates (in Table 3 for S&P’s) suggest that a haircut of as many as 36 
percentage points in the debt-to-GDP ratio (that is, from 179.7% in 2016 to 
143.7% in 2017) will, ceteris paribus, raise Greece’s credit rating by only 1 notch 
(≈36∗0.0277; results are similar using the estimates in Table 2 for Moody’s and 
in Table 4 for Fitch, respectively). A speedier and much more realistic (since debt 
haircut is not on the ‘negotiating table’) Greek exit from the ‘junk status territory’ 
would indeed be triggered by structural reforms (and an improvement in 
competitiveness). For instance, our estimates (in Table 3 for S&P’s) suggest that 
Greece would witness an upgrade of almost 3 notches24 by S&P’s, if it were to 
implement structural reforms that would raise its regulatory quality index to the 
level observed for Portugal.  
  
                                                          
21 See: https://www.esm.europa.eu/press-releases/esm-and-efsf-approve-short-term-debt-
relief-measures-greece.  
22 In 2017, the S&P’s, Moody’s and Fitch credit rating scores for Greece were B-, Caa3, and CCC, 
respectively. From Table 1, junk (or high credit risk) sovereign bonds carry a credit rating of BB+ 
or lower for S&P’s and Fitch and a credit rating of Ba1 or lower for Moody’s.  
23 Gibson et al. (2017) discuss in detail the strong interaction between sovereign ratings, sovereign 
borrowing costs and bank ratings in the Eurozone area.  
24 We derive 3 notches as ≈[(0.940-0.397)*5.075]; 5.075 is the estimated coefficient on regulatory 
quality and 0.947 and 0.397 refer to the regulatory quality values for Portugal and Greece, 
respectively. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper examines the determinants of sovereign credit ratings for the 
Eurozone countries from 2002 to 2015 in a panel quantile framework which 
allows the relative significance of the explanatory variables to vary across the 
quantile distribution of sovereign ratings. Our results are summarised as follows: 
First, the impact of the unemployment rate, regulatory quality and 
competitiveness is stronger for low rated countries whereas GDP per capita is a 
major driver of high rated countries; in other words, the high level of GDP per 
capita provides a ‘safety net’ safeguarding (to some extent) against downgrades 
in the case of high rated countries. Second, a reduction in the current account 
deficit or an increase in the current account surplus leads to a rating or outlook 
upgrade for low rated countries which have historically recorded high current 
account deficits whereas, for countries with strong payment capacity, a higher 
current account deficit or a lower current account surplus is associated with either 
higher creditworthiness or positive economic prospects of the economy and 
consequently a higher sovereign rating. Third, economic policy uncertainty 
impacts negatively on credit ratings across the quantile distribution; however, the 
impact is stronger on the lower rated countries. In other words, the 
creditworthiness of low rated countries takes a much bigger ‘hit’ than that of high 
rated countries when European uncertainty is on the rise. 
Our model, which allows for differential impact across the rating distribution, 
could arguably go some way towards shedding some light on how CRAs assign 
sovereign credit ratings. For instance, our counterfactual analysis suggests the 
pivotal role that economic policy uncertainty in the Euro area has played in driving 
down sovereign credit ratings in Eurozone’s periphery. We believe that our 
empirical analysis and results provide valuable information which can potentially 
be used by a new credit rating agency towards making credit rating decisions if 
indeed European policymakers decide to set up such an agency in the near future. 
What we have not considered in this paper is the possible impact (if any at all) of 
liquidity injections put forward by the ECB in terms of purchases and holdings of 
securities for monetary policy purposes from 2009 onwards (see the discussion 
in Lo Duca et al., 2016) and post-2014 Quantitative Easing support (see e.g. the 
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discussion in Koijen et al., 2016) on Eurozone’s sovereign credit ratings. If, for 
instance, these types of policies provide a ‘signal’ that Eurozone’s economic 
recovery is, at best, shaky, CRAs might become more reluctant to proceed with a 
number of sovereign upgrades. The counter-argument, of course, is that ECB’s 
policies might have safeguarded against deteriorating economic conditions, 
therefore preventing additional sovereign downgrades over the recent years. We 
intend to explore these issues in future research. 
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Table 1: Linear transformation of sovereign ratings 
 
 
Rating Agency Rating Grades
Fitch S&P's Moody's Outlook (1-21)
Highest quality AAA AAA Aaa Stable 21
Negative 20.67
Positive 20.33
AA+ AA+ Aa1 Stable 20
Negative 19.67
Positive 19.33
High quality AA AA Aa2 Stable 19
Negative 18.67
Positive 18.33
AA- AA- Aa3 Stable 18
Negative 17.67
Positive 17.33
A+ A+ A1 Stable 17
Negative 16.67
Positive 16.33
Strong payment A A A2 Stable 16
capacity Negative 15.67
Positive 15.33
A- A- A3 Stable 15
Negative 14.67
Positive 14.33
BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 Stable 14
Negative 13.67
Adequate payment Positive 13.33
capacity BBB BBB Baa2 Stable 13
Negative 12.67
Positive 12.33
BBB- BBB- Baa3 Stable 12
Negative 11.67
Positive 11.33
BB+ BB+ Ba1 Stable 11
Negative 10.67
Likely to fullfill Positive 10.33
obligations, ongoing BB BB Ba2 Stable 10
uncertainty Negative 9.67
Positive 9.33
BB- BB- Ba3 Stable 9
Negative 8.67
Positive 8.33
B+ B+ B1 Stable 8
Negative 7.67
Positive 7.33
High credit  risk B B B2 Stable 7
Negative 6.67
Positive 6.33
B- B- B3 Stable 6
Negative 5.67
Positive 5.33
CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 Stable 5
Negative 4.67
Positive 4.33
Very high credit CCC CCC Caa2 Stable 4
risk Negative 3.67
Positive 3.33
CCC- CCC- Caa3 Stable 3
Negative 2.66
Non default wih CC CC Ca 2.33
possibility of recovery C 2
Default DDD SD C
DD D 1
D
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Table 2: Estimates for Moody’s, 2002-2015 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Dependent Variable: Moody's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 -1.1960 0.000 -0.0264 0.000 0.1159 0.000 0.2609 0.000 -0.3202 0.000 4.3321 0.000 -0.0467 0.000 -0.0325 0.000 9.207 0.585
0.10 -0.6623 0.000 -0.0384 0.000 0.0604 0.000 0.0332 0.000 -0.3341 0.000 4.3158 0.000 -0.0360 0.000 -0.0158 0.000 9.072 0.594
0.15 0.6975 0.000 -0.0370 0.000 0.0077 0.000 -0.0027 0.000 -0.2744 0.000 4.1139 0.000 -0.0349 0.000 -0.0119 0.000 8.804 0.608
0.20 3.1277 0.000 -0.0387 0.000 -0.0508 0.000 0.0034 0.864 -0.2400 0.000 4.1229 0.000 -0.0313 0.000 -0.0117 0.000 8.049 0.627
0.25 4.6216 0.000 -0.0449 0.000 -0.0196 0.014 -0.0680 0.000 -0.1907 0.000 3.3931 0.000 -0.0329 0.000 -0.0175 0.000 7.426 0.639
0.30 5.4820 0.000 -0.0372 0.000 -0.0377 0.000 0.0410 0.203 -0.1181 0.000 4.1231 0.000 -0.0341 0.000 -0.0109 0.000 7.528 0.625
0.35 4.8628 0.000 -0.0412 0.000 -0.1542 0.011 -0.1530 0.024 -0.1286 0.000 3.2106 0.000 -0.0251 0.000 -0.0307 0.000 7.345 0.575
0.40 3.3678 0.000 -0.0082 0.000 -0.0739 0.001 0.0221 0.576 -0.2136 0.000 4.4561 0.000 -0.0484 0.000 -0.0136 0.000 7.884 0.584
0.45 4.3645 0.000 0.0089 0.153 -0.0789 0.000 -0.0111 0.694 -0.2083 0.000 4.0718 0.000 -0.0294 0.000 -0.0191 0.000 7.092 0.533
0.50 3.7006 0.000 0.0032 0.337 -0.0226 0.000 -0.1233 0.000 -0.2119 0.000 2.4526 0.000 -0.0156 0.000 -0.0140 0.000 7.505 0.554
0.55 4.4081 0.000 -0.0097 0.000 0.0050 0.029 -0.0834 0.000 -0.2319 0.000 1.6651 0.000 -0.0325 0.000 -0.0158 0.000 7.621 0.589
0.60 6.7502 0.000 -0.0272 0.000 -0.0347 0.056 0.0363 0.213 -0.2010 0.000 1.9421 0.000 -0.0263 0.000 -0.0062 0.001 8.069 0.627
0.65 6.9493 0.000 -0.0168 0.000 -0.0641 0.000 -0.2221 0.000 -0.2727 0.000 0.6950 0.000 0.0036 0.656 0.0091 0.070 8.414 0.519
0.70 8.4967 0.000 -0.0246 0.000 -0.0411 0.000 -0.1600 0.000 -0.0403 0.163 0.9713 0.001 -0.0100 0.000 -0.0042 0.000 8.736 0.519
0.75 9.7634 0.000 -0.0308 0.000 -0.0263 0.025 -0.1112 0.011 0.0133 0.629 0.3437 0.180 -0.0201 0.000 -0.0076 0.002 8.889 0.495
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Table 3: Estimates for S&P’s, 2002-2015 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. 
 
Dependent Variable: S&P's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 -0.1961 0.000 -0.0277 0.000 0.0565 0.000 0.0361 0.000 -0.3655 0.000 5.0575 0.000 -0.0687 0.000 -0.0219 0.000 9.101 0.620
0.10 2.7722 0.000 -0.0316 0.000 0.0156 0.000 -0.0336 0.000 -0.2247 0.000 3.3226 0.000 -0.0539 0.000 -0.0112 0.000 8.414 0.663
0.15 4.1889 0.000 -0.0398 0.000 0.0424 0.000 -0.1598 0.000 -0.2510 0.000 1.8446 0.000 -0.0417 0.000 -0.0118 0.000 8.019 0.681
0.20 4.8046 0.000 -0.0293 0.000 0.0194 0.049 -0.1416 0.000 -0.2487 0.000 2.7552 0.000 -0.0328 0.000 -0.0206 0.000 7.397 0.684
0.25 3.2558 0.000 -0.0237 0.000 0.0540 0.000 -0.1174 0.000 -0.2821 0.000 2.6147 0.000 -0.0420 0.000 -0.0159 0.000 8.292 0.675
0.30 4.5407 0.000 -0.0277 0.000 0.0555 0.000 -0.0873 0.000 -0.2470 0.000 2.4303 0.000 -0.0439 0.000 -0.0109 0.000 7.616 0.682
0.35 5.6193 0.000 -0.0402 0.000 -0.0202 0.035 -0.2705 0.000 -0.2713 0.000 2.3127 0.000 -0.0324 0.000 -0.0151 0.000 6.908 0.683
0.40 6.2628 0.000 -0.0270 0.000 0.0083 0.303 -0.1976 0.000 -0.2361 0.000 1.7445 0.000 -0.0275 0.000 -0.0129 0.000 7.490 0.687
0.45 6.5806 0.000 -0.0209 0.000 0.0130 0.003 -0.1212 0.000 -0.2405 0.000 1.3283 0.000 -0.0275 0.000 -0.0066 0.000 7.834 0.670
0.50 5.4772 0.000 -0.0069 0.046 -0.0419 0.308 -0.1020 0.000 -0.2703 0.000 1.0692 0.000 -0.0041 0.169 -0.0153 0.000 7.345 0.636
0.55 8.1589 0.000 -0.0373 0.000 -0.0568 0.029 -0.0810 0.000 -0.2010 0.000 1.6103 0.000 -0.0191 0.000 0.0007 0.810 8.576 0.671
0.60 8.3574 0.000 -0.0200 0.000 -0.0129 0.315 0.0264 0.686 -0.1562 0.000 0.4308 0.072 0.0118 0.000 -0.0109 0.000 8.727 0.645
0.65 8.8327 0.000 -0.0211 0.000 -0.0524 0.001 -0.3271 0.000 -0.2436 0.000 1.1058 0.000 0.0036 0.360 0.0137 0.000 8.896 0.567
0.70 11.1976 0.000 -0.0370 0.000 -0.0311 0.007 -0.0352 0.245 -0.0564 0.000 -0.2596 0.417 0.0009 0.460 -0.0085 0.000 9.133 0.619
0.75 12.6666 0.000 -0.0429 0.000 -0.0292 0.105 -0.0962 0.005 0.0169 0.359 0.1282 0.343 -0.0061 0.009 -0.0064 0.089 9.316 0.591
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Table 4: Estimates for Fitch, 2002-2015 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 0.8393 0.000 -0.0237 0.000 0.0960 0.000 -0.0463 0.000 -0.4446 0.000 1.2453 0.000 -0.0509 0.000 -0.0317 0.000 9.116 0.577
0.10 0.7370 0.000 -0.0179 0.000 0.0765 0.000 -0.1005 0.000 -0.4457 0.000 2.8360 0.000 -0.0389 0.000 -0.0115 0.000 8.911 0.633
0.15 2.3524 0.000 -0.0253 0.000 0.0583 0.000 -0.1070 0.000 -0.4223 0.000 2.7182 0.000 -0.0419 0.000 -0.0053 0.000 8.563 0.651
0.20 3.4014 0.000 -0.0203 0.000 0.0433 0.000 -0.1092 0.000 -0.3287 0.000 2.6176 0.000 -0.0421 0.000 -0.0107 0.000 8.214 0.663
0.25 6.5064 0.000 -0.0294 0.000 -0.0045 0.442 -0.1364 0.000 -0.3004 0.000 1.6866 0.000 -0.0488 0.000 -0.0093 0.000 7.198 0.669
0.30 4.7267 0.000 -0.0554 0.000 0.0523 0.019 -0.2287 0.000 -0.3111 0.000 1.3404 0.000 -0.0381 0.000 0.0040 0.441 7.729 0.634
0.35 5.6993 0.000 -0.0074 0.000 -0.0179 0.006 -0.0578 0.000 -0.2201 0.000 2.2305 0.000 -0.0370 0.000 -0.0118 0.000 7.267 0.635
0.40 6.5795 0.000 -0.0120 0.000 -0.0386 0.000 -0.1348 0.000 -0.1908 0.000 2.3079 0.000 -0.0388 0.000 -0.0152 0.000 7.794 0.633
0.45 6.1085 0.000 -0.0122 0.000 -0.0202 0.000 -0.0288 0.035 -0.2246 0.000 2.7174 0.000 -0.0402 0.000 -0.0098 0.000 7.632 0.647
0.50 5.4025 0.000 -0.0128 0.000 -0.0241 0.144 -0.1071 0.000 -0.2603 0.000 2.5984 0.000 -0.0315 0.000 0.0049 0.201 7.495 0.630
0.55 5.2451 0.000 -0.0092 0.001 0.0082 0.309 -0.0148 0.259 -0.2261 0.000 2.3528 0.000 -0.0221 0.000 -0.0077 0.000 7.297 0.660
0.60 9.3137 0.000 -0.0249 0.000 -0.0217 0.000 -0.0429 0.000 -0.1646 0.000 0.1749 0.006 -0.0177 0.000 -0.0010 0.097 8.789 0.632
0.65 10.1534 0.000 -0.0262 0.000 -0.0306 0.000 -0.0698 0.000 -0.1308 0.000 0.6065 0.000 -0.0091 0.000 0.0009 0.667 9.021 0.616
0.70 9.1753 0.000 -0.0292 0.000 -0.0575 0.000 -0.1863 0.000 -0.0706 0.000 0.8319 0.000 -0.0133 0.000 0.0006 0.832 8.843 0.595
0.75 11.8393 0.000 -0.0379 0.000 -0.0449 0.000 -0.1528 0.000 -0.0069 0.193 -0.7012 0.000 -0.0181 0.000 0.0025 0.132 9.182 0.498
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Table 5: Impact of European policy uncertainty on ratings for Moody’s  
Year Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Cyprus 
2008 -0.535 -0.212 -0.442 -0.442 -0.212 -0.392 
2009 -0.314 -0.112 -0.283 -0.250 -0.135 -0.250 
2010 -1.037 -0.780 -1.037 -0.893 -0.410 -0.918 
2011 -3.025 -1.471 -1.632 -3.025 -2.860 -1.471 
2012 -3.521 -1.712 -1.712 -3.521 -1.712 -3.521 
2013 -2.707 -1.316 -1.316 -2.707 -1.316 -2.707 
2014 -1.453 -0.532 -0.532 -0.707 -0.532 -1.453 
2015 -2.010 -0.736 -0.736 -0.977 -0.736 -2.010 
 
Notes: Table 5 illustrates the effects of European policy uncertainty on credit ratings by using 
estimates of our credit rating model under uncertainty to infer what credit ratings would have 
been had uncertainty remained at its 2002-2007 average value. To do this, we construct the 
difference between the fitted values of the estimates of credit rating model (1) for Moody’s (as 
reported in Table 2) and the fitted values of the counterfactual model (1) which sets the post 2007 
values of the uncertainty variable equal to its 2002-2007 average. 
 
Table 6: Impact of European policy uncertainty on ratings for S&P’s 
Year Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Cyprus 
2008 -0.4227 -0.1800 -0.1855 -0.4280 -0.1800 -0.1855 
2009 -0.2108 0.0128 -0.1187 -0.2317 -0.1954 -0.1187 
2010 -0.7379 -0.7151 -0.4352 -1.3492 0.0469 -0.7151 
2011 -2.0431 -1.9144 -1.0146 -1.0470 -1.4244 -1.0470 
2012 -2.3775 -1.2761 -1.2184 -2.3775 -1.2184 -2.3775 
2013 -1.8281 -1.7130 -0.9369 -1.8281 -0.9369 -1.8281 
2014 -0.9815 -0.6757 -0.5030 -0.9815 -0.5268 -0.9815 
2015 -1.3576 -0.4103 -0.6957 -0.6957 -0.7287 -1.3576 
 
Notes: Table 6 illustrates the effects of European policy uncertainty on credit ratings by using 
estimates of our credit rating model under uncertainty to infer what credit ratings would have 
been had uncertainty remained at its 2002-2007 average value. To do this, we construct the 
difference between the fitted values of the estimates of credit rating model (1) for S&P’s (as 
reported in Table 3) and the fitted values of the counterfactual model (1) which sets the post 2007 
values of the uncertainty variable equal to its 2002-2007 average. 
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Table 7: Impact of European policy uncertainty on ratings for Fitch 
Year Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Cyprus 
2008 0.1132 0.0687 0.1382 -0.2166 0.0687 0.1382 
2009 -0.0945 0.0884 0.0884 0.0884 0.0439 0.0884 
2010 -0.7522 -0.7007 0.3240 -0.7734 0.0596 0.3240 
2011 -2.9516 -0.4918 -1.0974 -2.9516 -0.9145 -1.0673 
2012 -3.4349 -0.5723 -1.1569 -3.4349 -1.2420 -3.4349 
2013 -2.6411 -0.8896 -0.4401 -2.6411 -0.9550 -2.6411 
2014 -1.4179 -0.4160 -0.4776 -0.5127 -0.4776 -1.4179 
2015 -1.9613 -0.5754 -0.6606 -0.7092 -0.6606 -1.9613 
 
Notes: Table 7 illustrates the effects of European policy uncertainty on credit ratings by using 
estimates of our credit rating model under uncertainty to infer what credit ratings would have 
been had uncertainty remained at its 2002-2007 average value. To do this, we construct the 
difference between the fitted values of the estimates of credit rating model (1) for Fitch (as 
reported in Table 4) and the fitted values of the counterfactual model (1) which sets the post 2007 
values of the uncertainty variable equal to its 2002-2007 average. 
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Figure 1: Uncertainty measures 
 
Note: The survey-based uncertainty are from Girardi and Reuter (2017) and the other two from 
Baker et al (2015). 
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Figure 2: Impact of regulatory quality on ratings for Moody’s: Quantile panel 
model versus standard panel model with fixed individual and time effects 
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Figure 3: Impact of competitiveness on ratings for Fitch: Quantile panel model 
versus standard panel model with fixed individual and time effects 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Data definitions and sources 
 
  
Data Definitions
Variable Name Definition Source
Fitch rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of each year Fitch
S&P's rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of each year S&P's
Moody's rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st  December of each year Moody's
GDP per capita Log GDP per capita, US dollars, constant 2005 prices World Bank
Government debt General government gross dedt as a percent of GDP IMF WEO
Current account balance Current account balance as a percent of GDP IMF WEO
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate as a percent of total labor force IMF WEO
Inflation Rate Annual growth rate of consumer price index IMF WEO
Regulatory Quality Aggregate government indicator World Bank
Harmonised competitiveness indicator based on unit labour 
costs indices for the total economy
European Policy Uncertainty Eurozone countries average www.policyuncertainty.com
Competitiveness Indicator ECB
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Table A.2: Estimates for Moody’s with first order lags as instrumental variables, 2002-2015 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: Moody's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 -0.7718 0.000 -0.0272 0.000 0.1196 0.000 0.2586 0.000 -0.3085 0.000 4.2377 0.000 -0.0476 0.000 -0.0307 0.000 9.150 0.593
0.10 -0.5901 0.000 -0.0390 0.000 0.0580 0.000 0.0355 0.000 -0.3339 0.000 4.2815 0.000 -0.0361 0.000 -0.0158 0.000 9.064 0.594
0.15 0.8942 0.000 -0.0396 0.000 0.0158 0.000 -0.0143 0.000 -0.2801 0.000 3.7907 0.000 -0.0376 0.000 -0.0108 0.000 8.801 0.609
0.20 2.7490 0.000 -0.0412 0.000 0.0030 0.000 -0.0328 0.000 -0.2265 0.000 3.7852 0.000 -0.0367 0.000 -0.0104 0.000 8.288 0.626
0.25 5.8908 0.000 -0.0456 0.000 -0.0179 0.008 -0.1727 0.000 -0.1720 0.000 2.6823 0.000 -0.0199 0.000 -0.0165 0.000 7.401 0.638
0.30 4.6627 0.000 -0.0304 0.000 -0.1361 0.000 -0.1292 0.000 -0.0936 0.000 6.3281 0.000 -0.0177 0.000 -0.0087 0.000 7.774 0.575
0.35 4.2664 0.000 -0.0223 0.000 -0.0379 0.000 -0.0257 0.283 -0.1272 0.000 4.0622 0.000 -0.0298 0.000 -0.0172 0.000 7.126 0.626
0.40 3.9472 0.000 -0.0056 0.015 -0.0209 0.024 0.0234 0.454 -0.2066 0.000 3.2522 0.000 -0.0379 0.000 -0.0146 0.000 7.578 0.585
0.45 3.0212 0.000 -0.0035 0.014 -0.0707 0.019 0.0439 0.018 -0.2055 0.000 4.9529 0.000 -0.0403 0.000 -0.0176 0.000 7.904 0.583
0.50 2.7157 0.001 0.0074 0.295 -0.0648 0.000 -0.0743 0.324 -0.2392 0.000 3.2915 0.000 -0.0093 0.038 -0.0106 0.000 7.792 0.554
0.55 8.1312 0.000 -0.0318 0.000 -0.0003 0.978 -0.1885 0.000 -0.0999 0.000 -0.0333 0.915 -0.0224 0.000 -0.0122 0.000 8.358 0.570
0.60 5.4859 0.000 -0.0111 0.030 -0.0309 0.159 -0.1036 0.025 -0.1875 0.000 1.5205 0.001 -0.0290 0.000 -0.0091 0.000 7.258 0.568
0.65 8.1615 0.000 -0.0217 0.000 -0.0377 0.000 -0.1567 0.012 -0.0658 0.000 0.6343 0.000 -0.0157 0.000 -0.0037 0.307 8.608 0.509
0.70 9.4343 0.000 -0.0264 0.000 -0.0342 0.000 -0.0781 0.021 -0.0191 0.015 0.2237 0.299 -0.0193 0.000 -0.0052 0.000 8.841 0.496
0.75 10.5101 0.000 -0.0357 0.000 -0.0379 0.003 -0.1316 0.000 0.0251 0.113 0.1774 0.398 -0.0222 0.000 -0.0087 0.001 8.983 0.502
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Table A.3: Estimates for S&P’s with first order lags as instrumental variables, 2002-2015  
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: S&P's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 0.2561 0.223 -0.0332 0.000 0.0996 0.000 0.1097 0.000 -0.3598 0.000 5.0597 0.000 -0.0704 0.000 -0.0224 0.000 9.049 0.629
0.10 3.1985 0.000 -0.0336 0.000 0.0123 0.000 -0.0188 0.000 -0.2321 0.000 3.1895 0.000 -0.0540 0.000 -0.0091 0.000 8.277 0.666
0.15 4.1839 0.000 -0.0403 0.000 0.0425 0.000 -0.1568 0.000 -0.2497 0.000 1.8321 0.000 -0.0425 0.000 -0.0128 0.000 8.048 0.680
0.20 3.8653 0.000 -0.0317 0.000 0.0616 0.000 -0.0849 0.006 -0.2305 0.000 2.4660 0.000 -0.0412 0.000 -0.0145 0.000 8.034 0.684
0.25 5.2135 0.000 -0.0386 0.000 0.0713 0.002 -0.1237 0.000 -0.2467 0.000 1.7475 0.000 -0.0456 0.000 -0.0167 0.000 7.554 0.685
0.30 4.5990 0.000 -0.0285 0.000 0.0421 0.001 -0.0986 0.000 -0.2503 0.000 2.4420 0.000 -0.0466 0.000 -0.0124 0.000 7.663 0.682
0.35 5.0184 0.000 -0.0234 0.000 0.0311 0.000 -0.1279 0.000 -0.1890 0.000 2.5447 0.000 -0.0393 0.000 -0.0154 0.000 7.068 0.679
0.40 7.0828 0.000 -0.0235 0.000 -0.0323 0.452 -0.2229 0.000 -0.2458 0.000 1.5197 0.000 -0.0227 0.009 -0.0113 0.000 8.059 0.674
0.45 5.8402 0.000 -0.0189 0.000 -0.0128 0.593 -0.1645 0.016 -0.2379 0.000 2.0647 0.000 -0.0289 0.000 -0.0088 0.000 7.406 0.672
0.50 6.6124 0.000 -0.0222 0.000 -0.0113 0.212 -0.2705 0.000 -0.2465 0.000 1.5298 0.000 -0.0210 0.000 -0.0053 0.025 7.938 0.666
0.55 5.1502 0.000 -0.0213 0.000 -0.0181 0.029 0.0020 0.927 -0.2167 0.000 3.6500 0.000 -0.0184 0.000 -0.0004 0.863 7.684 0.664
0.60 7.9678 0.000 -0.0281 0.000 0.0271 0.007 -0.0017 0.957 -0.1486 0.000 -0.0360 0.907 -0.0041 0.081 -0.0056 0.000 8.517 0.661
0.65 8.2714 0.000 -0.0321 0.000 0.0111 0.416 -0.2254 0.007 -0.1171 0.000 0.8732 0.001 -0.0254 0.000 -0.0067 0.289 8.490 0.654
0.70 10.5796 0.000 -0.0422 0.000 -0.0138 0.002 -0.1360 0.000 -0.0601 0.000 0.2215 0.092 -0.0039 0.009 -0.0071 0.007 9.033 0.640
0.75 11.5694 0.000 -0.0378 0.000 -0.0127 0.122 -0.1121 0.000 -0.0254 0.000 0.3859 0.054 -0.0028 0.161 -0.0048 0.383 9.209 0.605
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Table A.4: Estimates for Fitch with first order lags as instrumental variables, 2002-2015  
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness             Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 0.5366 0.000 -0.0204 0.000 0.1048 0.000 -0.0159 0.000 -0.4264 0.000 1.6633 0.000 -0.0492 0.000 -0.0297 0.000 9.113 0.587
0.10 -0.4317 0.000 -0.0093 0.000 0.0646 0.000 -0.1265 0.000 -0.4788 0.000 3.5251 0.000 -0.0380 0.000 -0.0052 0.000 9.028 0.611
0.15 1.9404 0.000 -0.0240 0.000 0.0662 0.000 -0.1173 0.000 -0.4323 0.000 2.6932 0.000 -0.0421 0.000 -0.0042 0.000 8.662 0.645
0.20 3.7112 0.000 -0.0213 0.000 0.0246 0.000 -0.1000 0.000 -0.3350 0.000 2.6471 0.000 -0.0437 0.000 -0.0091 0.000 8.086 0.663
0.25 4.4816 0.000 -0.0185 0.000 -0.0020 0.756 -0.1843 0.000 -0.3376 0.000 2.3379 0.000 -0.0379 0.000 -0.0095 0.000 7.643 0.664
0.30 4.4702 0.000 -0.0026 0.245 -0.0674 0.000 -0.1153 0.001 -0.2963 0.000 3.8467 0.000 -0.0235 0.000 -0.0046 0.000 6.999 0.633
0.35 6.3135 0.000 -0.0052 0.112 -0.0613 0.287 -0.0742 0.047 -0.2090 0.000 2.7420 0.000 -0.0297 0.005 -0.0107 0.000 7.962 0.625
0.40 6.5421 0.000 -0.0082 0.001 -0.0443 0.164 -0.1001 0.131 -0.2181 0.000 2.3106 0.000 -0.0397 0.000 -0.0154 0.000 7.765 0.626
0.45 5.9594 0.000 -0.0117 0.000 -0.0195 0.146 -0.1031 0.063 -0.2269 0.000 2.6819 0.000 -0.0372 0.000 -0.0039 0.284 7.676 0.637
0.50 5.9069 0.000 -0.0177 0.000 -0.0405 0.000 -0.2021 0.000 -0.2611 0.000 2.1313 0.000 -0.0374 0.000 0.0053 0.000 7.589 0.627
0.55 7.3734 0.000 -0.0133 0.000 -0.0199 0.000 -0.0637 0.000 -0.2130 0.000 1.8956 0.000 -0.0221 0.000 -0.0048 0.000 8.382 0.647
0.60 6.1613 0.000 -0.0178 0.000 0.0217 0.000 -0.1767 0.000 -0.2968 0.000 0.3757 0.000 0.0073 0.012 -0.0087 0.000 7.809 0.665
0.65 7.9307 0.000 -0.0205 0.000 -0.0029 0.756 -0.0691 0.002 -0.2220 0.000 0.9636 0.000 -0.0079 0.013 0.0073 0.010 8.627 0.623
0.70 9.5834 0.000 -0.0344 0.000 -0.0781 0.000 -0.1846 0.000 -0.0804 0.000 0.1674 0.263 -0.0190 0.000 -0.0055 0.013 8.806 0.625
0.75 11.6596 0.000 -0.0355 0.000 -0.0642 0.000 -0.1174 0.008 -0.0070 0.426 -0.1257 0.591 -0.0129 0.000 -0.0025 0.476 9.184 0.566
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Table A.5: Estimates for Moody’s using the US policy uncertainty index, 2002-2015 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: Moody's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness        US  Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 -1.0811 0.000 -0.0463 0.000 0.0798 0.000 0.1869 0.000 -0.3495 0.000 4.2204 0.000 -0.0390 0.000 -0.0105 0.000 9.125 0.553
0.10 -0.0365 0.000 -0.0510 0.000 0.0451 0.000 0.0346 0.000 -0.3460 0.000 3.5093 0.000 -0.0454 0.000 -0.0090 0.000 9.039 0.570
0.15 2.4221 0.000 -0.0460 0.000 -0.0298 0.000 -0.0239 0.000 -0.2643 0.000 3.6139 0.000 -0.0364 0.000 -0.0011 0.000 8.360 0.602
0.20 2.1861 0.000 -0.0416 0.000 -0.0049 0.000 0.0104 0.000 -0.2914 0.000 4.0044 0.000 -0.0434 0.000 -0.0050 0.000 8.476 0.608
0.25 2.8051 0.000 -0.0318 0.000 -0.0276 0.000 -0.0144 0.324 -0.2250 0.000 4.3131 0.000 -0.0399 0.000 -0.0102 0.000 8.166 0.610
0.30 4.2157 0.000 -0.0295 0.000 -0.0348 0.003 0.0851 0.001 -0.1798 0.000 5.0614 0.000 -0.0479 0.000 0.0032 0.335 7.060 0.588
0.35 3.8584 0.000 -0.0245 0.000 -0.0717 0.000 0.0248 0.116 -0.1511 0.000 4.7225 0.000 -0.0504 0.000 -0.0128 0.000 7.579 0.586
0.40 4.2968 0.000 -0.0250 0.000 -0.0368 0.000 -0.0411 0.006 -0.1663 0.000 3.7575 0.000 -0.0468 0.000 -0.0013 0.569 7.228 0.586
0.45 4.5009 0.000 -0.0082 0.001 -0.0256 0.001 -0.0305 0.220 -0.2563 0.000 3.5760 0.000 -0.0272 0.000 -0.0097 0.001 7.050 0.577
0.50 6.4926 0.000 -0.0153 0.000 -0.0811 0.000 -0.0845 0.000 -0.1773 0.000 1.9668 0.000 -0.0326 0.000 0.0087 0.009 8.152 0.533
0.55 6.7314 0.000 -0.0196 0.000 -0.0078 0.120 -0.0476 0.000 -0.1232 0.000 1.0435 0.000 -0.0358 0.000 -0.0034 0.189 7.994 0.527
0.60 5.9102 0.000 -0.0152 0.000 0.0328 0.000 0.0019 0.842 -0.2000 0.000 0.9797 0.000 -0.0174 0.000 -0.0127 0.000 7.585 0.569
0.65 7.5368 0.000 -0.0163 0.001 -0.0560 0.363 -0.0246 0.267 -0.0631 0.000 0.8085 0.148 -0.0128 0.050 -0.0054 0.407 8.510 0.516
0.70 8.2166 0.000 -0.0201 0.000 -0.0393 0.000 -0.1358 0.000 -0.0800 0.000 0.4679 0.005 -0.0192 0.000 -0.0009 0.569 8.612 0.486
0.75 9.5034 0.000 -0.0257 0.000 -0.0445 0.000 -0.1482 0.000 -0.0332 0.463 0.1742 0.012 -0.0156 0.000 0.0140 0.174 8.951 0.420
38 
 
Table A.6: Estimates for S&P’s using the US policy uncertainty index, 2002-2015 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. 
Dependent Variable: S&P's rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness        US  Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 1.0733 0.000 -0.0455 0.000 0.0714 0.000 0.0970 0.000 -0.3025 0.000 4.1584 0.000 -0.0764 0.000 -0.0198 0.000 8.965 0.615
0.10 4.1456 0.000 -0.0398 0.000 -0.0020 0.453 -0.1039 0.000 -0.2420 0.000 2.2753 0.000 -0.0398 0.000 0.0008 0.849 7.707 0.668
0.15 7.3733 0.000 -0.0542 0.000 -0.0238 0.034 -0.1443 0.000 -0.1919 0.000 0.9407 0.000 -0.0364 0.000 -0.0019 0.375 7.971 0.672
0.20 4.3276 0.000 -0.0414 0.000 0.0767 0.000 -0.1416 0.000 -0.3205 0.000 2.6185 0.000 -0.0213 0.000 -0.0251 0.000 7.819 0.658
0.25 3.7672 0.000 -0.0248 0.000 0.0519 0.000 -0.0537 0.000 -0.2790 0.000 3.0710 0.000 -0.0452 0.000 -0.0125 0.000 7.985 0.665
0.30 5.3187 0.000 -0.0250 0.000 0.0143 0.022 -0.0288 0.118 -0.1949 0.000 3.5621 0.000 -0.0434 0.000 -0.0016 0.595 7.281 0.660
0.35 4.4419 0.000 -0.0306 0.000 -0.0248 0.013 -0.2510 0.000 -0.2719 0.000 2.8031 0.000 -0.0437 0.000 -0.0065 0.000 7.605 0.666
0.40 5.3021 0.000 -0.0213 0.000 0.0171 0.006 -0.1674 0.000 -0.2376 0.000 2.1254 0.000 -0.0342 0.000 -0.0049 0.159 6.948 0.661
0.45 7.2741 0.000 -0.0229 0.000 -0.0190 0.079 -0.1977 0.000 -0.2624 0.000 1.9839 0.000 -0.0313 0.000 -0.0075 0.001 8.166 0.658
0.50 5.8615 0.000 -0.0177 0.000 0.0046 0.840 -0.0878 0.000 -0.2357 0.000 2.3395 0.000 -0.0001 0.991 -0.0002 0.918 8.089 0.666
0.55 7.4878 0.000 -0.0125 0.006 -0.0181 0.487 -0.1858 0.000 -0.2607 0.000 1.8494 0.000 -0.0280 0.000 -0.0128 0.024 8.271 0.624
0.60 10.7138 0.000 -0.0381 0.000 -0.0661 0.046 -0.0819 0.011 -0.1080 0.000 0.6225 0.000 0.0086 0.001 -0.0283 0.003 9.038 0.610
0.65 9.8143 0.000 -0.0343 0.000 -0.0123 0.000 -0.1153 0.013 -0.0898 0.000 0.9291 0.000 -0.0075 0.002 -0.0048 0.160 8.953 0.639
0.70 10.7290 0.000 -0.0310 0.000 -0.0453 0.000 -0.2093 0.000 -0.0967 0.000 0.4517 0.229 0.0012 0.819 -0.0046 0.082 9.105 0.610
0.75 11.3388 0.000 -0.0399 0.000 -0.0016 0.873 -0.0665 0.000 -0.0346 0.212 0.3835 0.026 -0.0056 0.009 -0.0114 0.331 9.147 0.614
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Table A.7: Estimates for Fitch using the US policy uncertainty index, 2002-2015 
 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
Log GDP per capita Government Debt Current Account            Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate Regulatory Quality Competitiveness        US  Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
0.05 1.6295 0.000 -0.0408 0.000 0.0589 0.000 -0.2168 0.000 -0.4458 0.000 1.1758 0.000 -0.0329 0.000 -0.0126 0.000 8.871 0.603
0.10 1.6581 0.000 -0.0250 0.000 0.0282 0.000 -0.2082 0.000 -0.4687 0.000 2.6636 0.000 -0.0468 0.000 -0.0029 0.000 8.766 0.631
0.15 1.9947 0.000 -0.0266 0.000 0.0478 0.000 -0.1543 0.000 -0.4698 0.000 2.7098 0.000 -0.0367 0.000 0.0032 0.000 8.595 0.638
0.20 2.9458 0.000 -0.0229 0.000 0.0318 0.000 -0.1051 0.000 -0.3810 0.000 3.0963 0.000 -0.0410 0.000 -0.0056 0.000 8.305 0.653
0.25 4.4844 0.000 -0.0155 0.000 -0.0428 0.007 -0.1952 0.000 -0.3602 0.000 2.8791 0.000 -0.0391 0.000 -0.0129 0.009 7.594 0.644
0.30 3.0192 0.000 -0.0124 0.000 0.0251 0.000 -0.0799 0.000 -0.3332 0.000 3.3293 0.000 -0.0371 0.000 -0.0040 0.000 8.100 0.647
0.35 4.5063 0.000 -0.0224 0.000 -0.0132 0.727 -0.0882 0.000 -0.1951 0.000 3.5161 0.000 -0.0263 0.003 -0.0115 0.000 6.913 0.655
0.40 6.3075 0.000 -0.0125 0.000 -0.0371 0.000 -0.1339 0.000 -0.1951 0.000 2.4441 0.000 -0.0405 0.000 -0.0037 0.385 7.840 0.617
0.45 6.6617 0.000 -0.0101 0.000 -0.0317 0.000 -0.0819 0.000 -0.2160 0.000 2.9831 0.000 -0.0413 0.000 -0.0104 0.000 8.010 0.619
0.50 5.8961 0.000 -0.0154 0.000 -0.0149 0.280 -0.1328 0.000 -0.2610 0.000 2.2834 0.000 -0.0234 0.000 -0.0002 0.951 7.761 0.655
0.55 8.9905 0.000 -0.0320 0.000 -0.0097 0.399 -0.1322 0.000 -0.2261 0.000 0.2419 0.682 -0.0257 0.000 -0.0029 0.068 8.670 0.660
0.60 9.4244 0.000 -0.0222 0.000 -0.0320 0.000 -0.0241 0.223 -0.2069 0.000 0.1083 0.063 -0.0037 0.068 0.0002 0.484 8.873 0.633
0.65 9.9326 0.000 -0.0195 0.000 -0.0603 0.000 -0.1353 0.000 -0.1377 0.000 0.8549 0.000 -0.0086 0.001 -0.0015 0.090 8.989 0.604
0.70 10.7658 0.000 -0.0315 0.000 -0.0450 0.000 -0.1552 0.000 -0.0706 0.000 0.8198 0.000 -0.0064 0.000 0.0006 0.513 9.121 0.598
0.75 12.0175 0.000 -0.0344 0.000 -0.0866 0.000 -0.1331 0.000 0.0101 0.514 0.2083 0.143 -0.0120 0.000 -0.0014 0.787 9.253 0.545
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Figure A.1: Mapping of sovereign credit ratings to quantile distribution for 
Moody’s 
 
 
Figure A.2: Mapping of sovereign credit ratings to quantile distribution for S&P’s 
 
 
Figure A.3: Mapping of sovereign credit ratings to quantile distribution for Fitch 
 
